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2017 Bench Memorandum*

I.

REGULATORY AND FACTUAL FRAMEWORK.

A. PARTIES.
Cordelia Lear (Cordelia or Lear1) is an individual living on
Lear Island, which is located in Brittain County in the State of New
Union. She is the daughter of King James Lear and the sister of
Goneril Lear and Regan Lear. She is also the descendent of Cornelius Lear, who received Lear Island via congressional grant in
1803. Upon her father’s death in 2005, she came into possession of
an undeveloped 10-acre lot on Lear Island called the “Cordelia Lot”
or “the Heath.” Cordelia proposes to construct a home on her lot,
but the vast majority of the Heath has been designated a critical
habitat for the Karner Blue Butterfly, an endangered species.
The United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) is a
federal agency within the U.S. Department of the Interior responsible for enforcing and administering federal wildlife laws, including the Endangered Species Act. Its mission is to work with others
to conserve, protect, and enhance fish, wildlife, and plants and
their habitats for the continuing benefit of the American people.
* Please note that the Table of Contents has been omitted.
1. All references to “Lear” are to Cordelia. Other members of the Lear family
will be referred to by their first names or full names.
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Brittain County, New Union is a local government in the
State of New Union. The Brittain County Wetlands Board has permitting authority regarding wetlands in Brittain County, New Union. One of the Brittain County Wetlands Board’s regulations limits permits to fill wetlands to situations where the wetland would
be filled for a water-dependent use. Another rule conclusively establishes that a residential home site was not a water-dependent
use.
B. OVERVIEW OF APPLICABLE LEGAL AUTHORITY.
Generally speaking, this case involves two claims: First, that
the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544, is not
a valid exercise of congressional power under the Commerce
Clause in article I, section 8, clause 3. Second, that the ESA and
the Brittain County Wetlands Preservation Law2 together deprive
the Cordelia Lot of all economic value, resulting in a regulatory
taking without just compensation. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
The second claim contains a number of sub-issues, which will be
explained in greater detail in part V below.
While the issues are constitutional challenges that do not turn
on a direct application of the ESA, the ESA certainly impacts the
outcome of those claims and so understanding how it underlies the
litigation may be helpful. Enacted in 1973 and amended in 1978,
1982, and 1988,3 the ESA “is a commitment by the American people to work together to protect and restore those species that are
most at risk of extinction.” EARTHJUSTICE, CITIZENS’ GUIDE TO

2. Specific text of the Brittain County Wetlands Preservation Law has not
been provided to the competitors. Three important components of the Wetlands
Preservation Law can be divined from the facts, however: (1) that a permit is required to fill wetlands falling under its jurisdiction; (2) no permit can be issued
where the wetland would be filled for a non-water-dependent use; and (3) constructing a residential home is not a water-dependent use.
As a final point, the district court mentioned in a footnote that the Constitution of the State of New Union does not have something comparable to a Just
Compensation Clause and that New Union does not have statutes creating a just
compensation schema.
3. An earlier version also existed: The Endangered Species Preservation Act
was passed in 1966 and was amended in 1969 as the Endangered Species Conservation Act.
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ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 4 (2003).4 The ESA begins with a
congressional finding that “various species of fish, wildlife, and
plants in the United States have been rendered extinct as a consequence of economic growth and development untempered by adequate concern and conservation.” ESA § 2(a)(1), 16 U.S.C.
§ 1531(a)(1).
Under the ESA, the FWS is directed to “determine whether
any species is an endangered species or threatened species.” Id.
§ 4(a)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1). This process is called “listing,”
and the listed species are compiled at 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (2015).
“The term ‘species’ includes any subspecies of fish or wildlife or
plants, and any distinct population segment of any species or vertebrate fish or wildlife which interbreeds when mature.” ESA
§ 3(16), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16). An “endangered species” is “any species which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant
portion of its range.” Id. § 3(6), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6).5 Once the
FWS has listed a species as endangered, it must designate a critical habitat for the species.
Id. § 4(a)(3)(A), 16 U.S.C.
§ 1533(a)(3)(A).6 The Karner Blue Butterfly was listed as endangered in 1992. 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (2015); 57 Fed. Reg. 59,236 (Dec.
14, 1992).
Section 9 of the ESA prohibits the “take of any species within
the United States” if the species has been listed pursuant to ESA
§ 4, 16 U.S.C. § 1533, see ESA § 9(a)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C.
§ 1538(a)(1)(B); 50 C.F.R. § 17.21(c)(1). “The term “take” means to
harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or
collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.” ESA § 2(19),
16 U.S.C. § 1532(19). “Harm in the definition of “take” in the [ESA]
means an act which actually kills or injures wildlife. Such act may
include significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential
behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering.” 50
C.F.R. § 17.3. “Harass in the definition of ‘take’ in the [ESA] means
THE

4. This document is available at: http://earthustice.org/sites/default/files/library/reports/Citizens_Guide_ESA.pdf.
5. A “threatened species” is one “which is likely to become an endangered
species within the foreseeable future through all or a significant portion of its
range.” ESA § 3(20), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20).
6. The FWS shall designate a critical habitat concurrently with the determination that the species is endangered or threatened. ESA § 4(b)(6)(B), 16 U.S.C.
§ 1533(b)(6)(B).
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an intentional or negligent act or omission which creates the likelihood of injury to wildlife by annoying it to such an extent as to
significantly disrupt normal behavioral patterns which include,
but are not limited to, breeding, feeding, or sheltering.” Id.
ESA section 10 allows the Secretary of the Interior to “permit,
under such terms and conditions as he shall prescribe . . . any taking otherwise prohibited by section 1538(a)(1)(B) of this title if such
taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of
an otherwise lawful activity.” ESA § 10(a)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C.
§ 1539(a)(1)(B); 50 C.F.R. § 17.22. This permit is called an “incidental take permit (ITP).” No ITP shall be issued, however, unless
the applicant submits a habitat conservation plan (HCP). See ESA
§ 10(a)(2)(A), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A) (requiring ITP applicant to
submit a “conservation plan”); see also 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (“Conservation plans also are known as ‘habitat conservation plans’ or
‘HCPs.’”).7
Finally, ESA section 11 provides not only for civil penalties,
but criminal prosecution as well. ESA § 11(a)–(b), 16 U.S.C.
§ 1540(a)–(b). “Any person who knowingly violates any provision
of this chapter . . . shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than
$50,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.” Id.
§ 11(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(b).
The Commerce Clause8 gives Congress the power “to regulate
commerce . . . among the several states.” U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8,
cl. 3. Generally speaking, this grant of legislative power was fairly
narrow in the 19th century, but was substantially expanded by a
series of Supreme Court opinions in the 1930s. Following the Supreme Court’s opinion in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125
(1942), courts undeviatingly upheld congressional enactments until a pair of cases in the 1990s signaled a shift back in the opposite
direction, see United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000);
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, (1995). Since those cases,
courts remain generally deferential to Congress’s exercise of the

7. For more information about HCPs and the ESA, see FWS, Habitat Conservation
Plans
under
the
Endangered
Species
Act
(2011),
https://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/hcp.pdf.
8. Both the Commerce Clause and the Fifth Amendment have generated substantial bodies of case law. This section is meant only to provide a brief introduction to and overview of those provisions. The case law, including case law for the
relevant sub-issues, will be discussed in greater detail in parts IV and V below.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol8/iss1/2

4

22 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 8

Commerce power, but have been more skeptical of its reach than
in the last half-century.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, inter alia, “nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.”9 It applies not only to physical takings and condemnations, but regulatory takings as well. See First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles Cty., 482 U.S.
304, 316 (1987); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,
414–16 (1922). Most takings claims involve a balancing of policy
interests and ad hoc, fact-intensive inquiries. See Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). However, some categorical rules do exist: pertinent to the instant case,
when a government regulation totally deprives a property owner of
all economic value of their property, a taking has occurred and the
government must pay the property owner just compensation. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
List of Applicable Rules of Law:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3
U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 8, cl. 18
U.S. CONST., Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2
U.S. CONST., Amend. V
U.S. CONST., Amend. X
U.S. CONST., Amend. XIV
Endangered Species Act § 2, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2012)
Endangered Species Act § 3, 16 U.S.C. § 1532 (2012)
Endangered Species Act § 4, 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (2012)
Endangered Species Act § 9, 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2012)
Endangered Species Act § 10, 16 U.S.C. § 1539 (2012)
Endangered Species Act § 11, 16 U.S.C. § 1540 (2012)
50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2016)
50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (2016)
50 C.F.R. § 17.21 (2016)
50 C.F.R. § 17.22 (2016)

9. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment has been incorporated
against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897).
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HABITAT

C. SUMMARY OF FACTS AND PROCEDURE.
The undisputed facts established by the district court are as
follows:11
1. Lear Island is a 1,000-acre island in Lake Union, which is
a large interstate lake that has been traditionally used for interstate navigation. Lear Island was granted to Cornelius Lear in
1803 by an Act of Congress, when present-day New Union was part
of the Northwest Territory. The 1803 grant included title in fee
simple absolute to all of Lear Island and to “all lands under water
within a 300-foot radius of the shoreline,” as well as an additional
grant of lands under water in the shallow strait separating Lear
Island from the mainland.
2. Cornelius Lear and his descendants have occupied Lear Island since the 1803 grant, using the island as a homestead, farm,
and hunting and fishing grounds. The original homestead is still
located close to the north end of the island, near the strait that
separates the island from the mainland. When Lear Island was a
farm in the 19th century, produce was carried by boat from the
island to the mainland. In the early 20th century, the Lears constructed a causeway connecting the island to the mainland by road.
3. In 1965, King James Lear owned the entirety of the 1803
Lear Island grant. As part of an estate plan, King James divided
10. Available
at
https://www.fws.gov/midwest/endangered/permits/hcp/hcphandbook.html.
11. Although this factual summary contains all pertinent facts and procedure as developed by the opinion of the district court in the course of a seven-day
bench trial, it is condensed. Judges and brief graders should also review the Problem.
Additionally, the district court opinion in the Problem used numbered paragraphs to represent discrete factual findings following the bench trial. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 52. For the ease of judges and brief graders, this factual summary
remains faithful paragraph numbering in the Problem. Citations to the Problem
will generally be to the page
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Lear Island into three parcels, one for each of his daughters Goneril, Regan, and Cordelia. The Brittain Town Planning Board approved the subdivision of the property into three lots: the 550-acre
Goneril Lot, the 440-acre Regan Lot, and the 10-acre Cordelia
Lot.12 At the time of the subdivision, the Town Planning Board
determined that each lot could be developed with at least one single-family residence. King James then deeded each of the lots, respectively, to his three daughters, reserving a life estate in each lot
for himself. He continued to live in the homestead, located on the
Goneril Lot.
4. King James Lear died in 2005, and each of the three daughters came into possession of their deeded lots. In 2012, Plaintiff
Cordelia Lear decided to build a residence on her lot.
5. The Cordelia Lot is situated at the northern tip of Lear Island. The lot consists of an access strip that is 40 feet wide by 1,000
feet long, and an open field that comprises the remaining nine
acres of uplands. In addition, there is about one acre of emergent
cattail marsh in a cove that historically was open water and was
historically used as a boat landing.
6. The 9-acre open field and access strip has been kept open
by annual mowing in October by the Lear Family for several decades. The family has referred to the Cordelia Lot as “The Heath”
because it was kept open, unlike the rest of the island, which naturally became wooded after agricultural use of the island ceased in
1965.
7. The Heath and the access strip are covered with wild blue
lupine flowers, which thrive in the sandy soil of Lear Island. Fields
of wild blue lupines are essential for the survival of Karner Blue
larvae, which can only feed on the leaves of blue lupine plants. The
ideal habitat for the Karner Blues consists of partially shaded lupine flowers near successional forests.
8. The Karner Blue is an endangered species. 50 C.F.R.
§ 17.11 (2015). It was added to the federal endangered species list
on December 14, 1992. 57 Fed. Reg. 59,236 (Dec. 14, 1992).
9. Although populations of Karner Blues survive in other
states, the only remaining population of the butterfly in New Union lives on the Heath on Lear Island. Karner Blues do not migrate. Instead, eggs are laid in the fall, overwinter, and hatch in
12. The acreage figures do not include deeded lands underwater.
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the spring. A second brood hatches in the summer. Karner Blue
larvae remain attached to lupine plant foliage until they emerge
from chrysalis as butterflies, and any disturbance of the lupines
during the larval and chrysalis stages would result in the death of
the butterflies. Karner Blue populations have difficulty migrating
to new habitats as their flight distance is short, and they must follow woodland edge corridors. The New Union subpopulation of
Karner Blue is entirely intrastate and does not travel across any
State boundaries.
10. The Heath was designated by the FWS as critical habitat
for the New Union subpopulation of the Karner Blues in 1992.
11. In April 2012, Cordelia Lear contacted the New Union
FWS field office to inquire whether development of her property
would require any permits or approvals because of the existence of
the endangered butterfly population. FWS agent L.E. Pidopter advised her that any disturbance of the lupine habitat in the Heath
other than continued annual mowing would constitute a “take” of
the endangered butterfly. Pidopter also advised Lear that it was
possible to obtain an Incidental Take Permit (“ITP”) under ESA
§ 10, but in order to file an application for such a permit, Lear
would have to develop a habitat conservation plan (“HCP”) for the
Karner Blues and an environmental assessment document under
the National Environmental Policy Act. Pidopter advised Ms. Lear
that in order to be approvable, an HCP would have to provide for
additional contiguous lupine habitat on an acre-for-acre basis, including any disturbance of the access strip. Pidopter also advised
that an approvable HCP would require a commitment to maintain
the remaining lupine fields through annual fall mowing.
12. The only land that is contiguous to the Heath is the Goneril Lot. Cordelia is estranged from her sister, and Goneril has
refused to cooperate in any HCP that involves restrictions on her
property.
13. Lear investigated the cost of preparing the required HCP
for the Karner Blues, and was advised by an environmental consultant that preparation of an application for an ITP, including the
required HCP and environmental assessment documents, would
cost $150,000.
14. Following Cordelia Lear’s inquiry to the FWS, the FWS
New Union field office sent Cordelia Lear a letter on May 15, 2012
confirming that her entire ten-acre property was a critical habitat

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol8/iss1/2
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for the Karner Blues and that any disturbance to the lupine fields
other than annual October mowing would constitute a “take” of the
Karner Blues in violation of ESA § 9. The letter invited Lear to
submit an ITP application and referred her to the FWS’s Habitat
Conservation Planning Handbook for information on how to develop an acceptable HCP to submit with an ITP application. The
FWS letter reiterated that an acceptable HCP would require, at a
minimum, that all acreage of lupine field disturbed by development would have to be replaced with contiguous acreage, and that
Lear would have to commit to maintain the remaining and newly
created lupine fields by annual mowing each October.
15. Without annual mowing, the lupine fields on the Cordelia
Lot would naturally convert to a successional forest of oak and
hickory trees, eliminating the Karner Blues’ habitat. This process
would take about ten years. After ten years, this natural ecological
process would result in the extinction of the New Union subpopulation of the Karner Blues, unless a replacement habitat was created within a one-thousand-foot radius of the existing fields.
16. Rather than pursue an ITP application with the FWS,
Plaintiff developed an alternative development proposal (“ADP”)
that would not disturb the lupine fields. In the ADP, Lear proposed
to fill one half-acre of the marsh in the cove to create a lupine-free
building site, together with a causeway for access from the shared
mainland causeway without disturbing the access strip. As the
Army Corps of Engineers considers this portion of Lake Union to
be “non-navigable” for purposes of the Rivers and Harbors Act of
1899, and because construction of residential dwellings involving
one half-acre or less of fill is authorized by Army Corps of Engineers Nationwide Permit 29, see Issuance of Nationwide Permit for
Single-Family Housing, 60 Fed. Reg. 38,650 (July 27, 1995), no federal approvals would be needed for the ADP.
17. The ADP required a permit to fill the cove marsh, pursuant to the Brittain County Wetlands Preservation Law, which was
enacted in 1982. In August 2013, Lear duly filed a permit application with the Brittain County Wetlands Board. The permit was
denied in December 2013, on the grounds that permits to fill wetlands would only be granted for a water-dependent use, and that a
residential home site was not a water-dependent use.
18. The fair market value of the Cordelia Lot without any restrictions that would prevent development of a single-family house

9
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on the lot is $100,000. Property taxes on the Cordelia Lot are
$1,500 annually. There is no market in Brittain County for a parcel such as the Cordelia Lot for recreational use without the right
to develop a residence on the property, nor does the property have
any market in its current state as agricultural or timber land. Lear
has not sought reassessment of her property following the denial
of the permit under the Brittain County Wetland Preservation
Law. The Brittain County Butterfly Society has offered to pay Cordelia Lear $1,000 annually for the privilege of conducting butterfly
viewing outings during the summer Karner Blue season, but she
rejected the Society’s offer.
19. Plaintiff then commenced this action in February 2014,
seeking a declaration that the ESA was an unconstitutional exercise of congressional legislative power, or alternatively, seeking
just compensation from FWS and Brittain County for a regulatory
taking of her property.
On June 1, 2016, the District Court for the District of New Union entered judgment following a seven-day bench trial. The court
determined that the ESA is a legitimate exercise of congressional
power under the Commerce Clause, as applied to a wholly intrastate population of Karner Blue Butterfly. Next, the district court
determined that the combined effect of the ESA and the Brittain
County Wetlands Preservation Law totally deprived the Cordelia
Lot of all economic value, resulting in a taking under Lucas. In
making this second determination, the district court also determined that Lear’s claim was ripe notwithstanding the fact that
Lear did not apply for an ITP; that the relevant parcel of land for
Lear’s takings claim was the Cordelia Lot, not the entirety of Lear
Island; that the fact that the Cordelia Lot could become developable in 10 years if the Karner Blue habitat was destroyed naturally
through successional afforestation and non-mowing did not defeat
Lear’s takings claim; that the Brittain County Butterfly Society’s
offer to pay $1,000 annually in rent for wildlife viewing did not
preclude Lear’s takings claim based on a total deprivation of economic value; and that the public trust doctrine does not inhere in
Lear’s title and does not preclude Lear’s takings claim. Accordingly, the district court awarded Lear $90,000 in damages against
Brittain County and $10,000 in damages against FWS.
FWS, Lear, and Brittain County all filed timely notices of appeal filed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Twelfth

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol8/iss1/2

10

28 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 8

Circuit. FWS and Brittain County filed Notices of Appeal on June
9, 2016, and Lear filed a Notice of Appeal on June 10, 2016. The
Twelfth Circuit has already decided that it has jurisdiction of this
appeal.13
II. ISSUES.
•

Whether the ESA a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce
power, as applied to a wholly intrastate population of an
endangered butterfly that would be eliminated by construction of a single-family residence for personal use?
o On appeal, Lear and Brittain County will argue
the ESA is not a valid exercise of the Commerce
power.
o On appeal, FWS will argue the ESA is a valid use of
Congress’s Commerce power because the relevant
activity is constructing a house, which is plainly economic activity with the potential in aggregate of a
substantial effect on interstate commerce.

13. Generally speaking, a statute governing claims against the United
States—called the “Tucker Act”—places original jurisdiction of a claim for damages against the United States in the Court of Federal Claims. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1491(a)(1). There is a corollary statute, however—the “Little Tucker Act”—that
permits other district courts to have jurisdiction of claims against the United
States if the claim is for less than $10,000. See id. § 1346(a)(2). One way a plaintiff may avoid the Court of Federal Claims, should they desire to do so, is to waive
damages against the United States in excess of $10,000. See Chabal v. Reagan,
822 F.2d 349, 353 (3d Cir. 1987); Shaw v. Gwatney, 795 F.2d 1351, 1356 (8th Cir.
1986); Goble v. Marsh, 684 F.2d 12, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1982). In such a case, the Federal Circuit may have appellate jurisdiction under some circumstances, although
courts of appeal have been reluctant to give up jurisdiction of a case. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295; Chabal, 822 F.2d at 353.
Here, Lear waived damages in excess of $10,000 against the FWS and United
States, but did not waive damages in excess of that amount against Brittain
County. Accordingly, district court jurisdiction was proper. Further, applying
considerations in Chabal, the Twelfth Circuit likely has jurisdiction as well.
However, to avoid an issue of which court of appeals has jurisdiction to
hear this case, competitors were directed to assume the Twelfth Circuit
had already determined that it, and not the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, has jurisdiction of this matter. It is therefore expected that
neither district court jurisdiction nor appellate court jurisdiction
should be an issue that is either briefed or argued.

11
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•

Whether Lear’s takings claim against FWS ripe without
having applied for an ITP under ESA § 10(a)(1)(B), 16
U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B)?
o On appeal, FWS and Brittain County argue Lear’s
claim is not ripe since she did not apply for an ITP.
o On appeal, Lear will argue her claim is ripe even
though she did not apply for an ITP.

•

Whether, for Lear’s takings claim, the relevant parcel is the
entirety of Lear Island, or merely the Cordelia Lot as subdivided in 1965?
o On appeal, FWS and Brittain County argue the
entire island is the relevant parcel.
o On appeal, Lear argues the Cordelia Lot is.

•

Assuming the relevant parcel is the Cordelia Lot, does the
fact that the lot will become developable upon the natural
destruction of the butterfly habitat in ten years shield the
FWS and Brittain County from a takings claim based upon
a complete deprivation of economic value of the property?
o On appeal, FWS and Brittain County argue the
butterfly habitat’s natural destruction in the future
precludes Lear’s takings claim.
o On appeal, Lear argues it does not.

•

Assuming the relevant parcel is the Cordelia Lot, do public
trust principles inherent in title preclude Lear’s claim for a
taking based on the denial of a county wetlands permit?
o On appeal, FWS and Brittain County argue public
trust principles preclude Lear’s takings claim.
o On appeal, Lear argues they do not.

•

Assuming the relevant parcel is the Cordelia Lot, are FWS
and Brittain County liable for a complete deprivation of the
economic value of the Cordelia Lot when either the federal
or county regulation, by itself, would still allow development of a single-family residence?
o On appeal, Lear argues that even though the regulations would not individually amount to a taking

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol8/iss1/2
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under Lucas, the ESA and the Brittain County Wetlands Preservation Law together completely deprive
the Cordelia Lot of all economic value.
On appeal, FWS and Brittain County argue that
the ESA and the Brittain County Wetlands Preservation Law must be considered separately and thus
do not completely deprive the Cordelia Lot of all economic value.

Assuming the relevant parcel is the Cordelia Lot, does the
Brittain County Butterfly Society’s offer to pay $1,000 per
year in rent for wildlife viewing preclude a takings claim for
complete loss of economic value?
o On appeal, FWS and Brittain County argue it
does.
o On appeal, Lear argues it does not.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW.

United States courts of appeal “shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291.14 Generally speaking, where the district
court has made factual findings following a bench trial, an appellate court will not set those findings aside unless they are “clearly
erroneous.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6); Lentini v. Cal. Ctr. for the Arts,
Escondido, 370 F.3d 837, 843 (9th Cir. 2004). In contrast, a district
court’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Chandler v. City
of Dallas, 958 F.2d 85, 89 (5th Cir. 1992). A district court’s application of law to fact is also reviewed de novo. See Cree v. Flores,
157 F.3d 762, 769 (9th Cir. 1998).
IV. COMMERCE CLAUSE:
Is the ESA a valid exercise of the Commerce power?
In the district court, Lear sought a declaration that the ESA
is not a constitutional exercise of Congress’s Commerce power
when applied to a wholly intrastate population of an endangered
species. Brittain County agreed with Lear in the district court.

14. See note 13, supra.
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FWS resisted, arguing that the ESA substantially affects interstate commerce, particularly in situations like the present one,
where commercial activity—constructing a residence; developing
land; hiring contractors; and purchasing materials—threatens an
endangered species. The district court agreed. The ESA is probably a constitutional exercise of the Commerce power, but Lear and
Brittain County have several strong arguments.
Article I, section 8, clause 3 of the United States Constitution
gives Congress the power “to regulate commerce . . . among the
several states.” Generally speaking, the Commerce power permits
regulation of the instrumentalities and channels of interstate commerce. Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16–17 (2005). Additionally,
and pertinent to this case, the Commerce power also extends to
wholly intrastate activities that have a “close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions.”
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937). Even
intrastate activities that would have a trivial effect, let alone a substantial effect, on interstate commerce may be regulated if their
effect on interstate commerce, in the aggregate, would be substantial. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).
However, the Supreme Court clarified in United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598 (2000), that the activity must still be economic in nature. In
Lopez, the Court struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act
(GFSZA), which made possession of a firearm within a certain distance of a school. See 514 U.S. at 561. In Morrison, the Court
struck down the Violence Against Women Act, which made certain
gender-motivated acts of violence a federal crime. See 529 U.S. at
617. Morrison synthesized four factors considered in Lopez:
• First, the GFSZA, which Lopez struck down, was “‘a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with “commerce” or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly
one might define those terms.’” Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610
(quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561).
• Second, the GFSZA “contained ‘no express jurisdictional element which might limit its reach to a discrete set of firearm possessions that additionally have an explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce.’” Id. at 611–12
(quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562).
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•

Third, neither the GFSZA “‘nor its legislative history contain express congressional findings regarding the effects
upon interstate commerce of gun possession in a school
zone.’” Id. at 612 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562).
• Fourth, “Lopez rested in part on the fact that the link between gun possession and a substantial effect on interstate
commerce was attenuated.” Id. at 612.
The Lopez and Morrison Courts both clarified that the second
and third factors—a jurisdictional element in the statute and findings regarding the effects on interstate commerce of the regulated
activity—are not absolute requirements, but instead are factors to
be considered as part of the whole inquiry.
Initially, FWS will likely argue that nearly every court to consider whether the ESA is constitutional under the Commerce
Clause has concluded ESA is constitutional. See, e.g., San Luis &
Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Salazar, 638 F.3d 1163, 1177 (9th
Cir. 2011); Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coal. v. Kempthorne, 477
F.3d 1250, 1277 (11th Cir. 2007); Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323
F.3d 1062, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 2003); GDF Realty Investments, Ltd. v.
Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 640–41 (5th Cir. 2003); Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214
F.3d 483, 505–06 (4th Cir. 2000); Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v.
Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1997).15 These cases uphold the ESA as applied to some strikingly local species: for example, the Fifth Circuit upheld the ESA in the context of “six species
of subterranean invertebrates found only within two counties in
Texas.” GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 624. The Eleventh Circuit rejected a challenge to the ESA’s protection of the “Alabama sturgeon[, which] is a purely intrastate species with little, if any, commercial value, as evidenced by the fact that there have been no
reported commercial harvests of the fish in more than a century.”
Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coal., 477 F.3d at 1271. National
Ass’n of Home Builders affirmed the constitutionality of the ESA
15. FWS may also argue that the ESA has been before the Supreme Court
several times, and the Court has never questioned its constitutionality. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities
for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995); TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). Lear
and Brittain County can respond that judicial minimalism is precisely a goal that
the Court should strive for; so it would be inappropriate to rely on that consideration here. But see Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coal., 477 F.3d at 1272 (considering the fact that the Supreme Court has not mentioned the constitutionality of
the ESA in other cases).
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with respect to a fly that lived in an 8-mile radius in California.
See 130 F.3d at 1043. Moreover, most of these cases were decided
after Lopez and Morrison. Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coalition,
for example, included a thorough discussion of Lopez and Morrison.
See 477 F.3d at 1271–72. San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Authority explicitly recognized that Lopez and Morrison set forth the
controlling test for whether a statute is a constitutional exercise of
the Commerce power. See 638 F.3d at 1174.
In contrast, Lear and Brittain County will argue that none
of those cases are binding on the Twelfth Circuit and that People
for the Ethical Treatment of Property Owners v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv. (PETPO), 57 F. Supp. 3d 1337, 1344–46 (D. Utah 2014),
which held the ESA could not constitutionally be applied to takes
of Utah prairie dogs, is more persuasive. The PETPO court reasoned an ESA rule regarding the take of Utah prairie dogs was
unconstitutional because it did not regulate an economic activity.
Id. at 1344. Like the Karner Blue, they will argue, the effect of the
Utah Prairie dog on interstate commerce was attenuated; that the
ESA affected commerce by frustrating agricultural or commercial
development was not relevant to the Commerce Clause inquiry—
whether a take of an intrastate endangered species like the Utah
prairie dog was. Id. “In other words, the question in the present
case is whether take of the Utah prairie dog has a substantial effect
on interstate commerce, not whether the regulation preventing the
take has such an effect.” Id. FWS will reply that PETPO is a singular outlier, but Brittain County and Lear can also point to a
dissent written by then-Circuit Judge John Roberts in a denial of
a petition for rehearing en banc in Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton,
334 F.3d 1158 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (per curiam). Like the PETPO
court, Judge Roberts argued that the central inquiry is not whether
the regulation substantially impacts interstate commerce, but
whether the regulated activity does. Id. at 1160 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Viewing the ESA in the proper light, they will argue, its
constitutionality is in serious doubt.
FWS should counter that the Court’s recent Commerce Clause
jurisprudence has language suggesting that the dispositive issue
is whether the regulation itself bears a significant relationship to
interstate commerce. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (“‘[W]here a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to com-
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merce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence.’” (Quoting Maryland v.
Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 n.27 (1968))). In addition, Raich stressed
that Congress has the “power to regulate purely local activities
that are part of an economic “class of activities” that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.” 545 U.S. at 17 (quoting
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 151 (1971)) (emphasis added).
Raich elaborated on this formulation: “That the regulation ensnares some purely intrastate activity is of no moment. As we have
done many times before, we refuse to excise individual components
of that larger scheme.” Id. at 22. Moreover, the Court emphasized
that it need not determine whether regulated “activities, taken in
the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but
only whether a ‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding.” Id. Lear
and Brittain County can maintain that those are the very cases
limiting the Commerce power, and, more importantly, Raich upheld the regulation at issue—a criminal prohibition on the possession of marijuana—precisely because a market, albeit an illegal
one, existed.
FWS will stress that “economic activity must be understood in
broad terms.” Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 491. Consequently, FWS will
likely argue that even if the relevant activity is not a plainly commercial activity like constructing a residence, biodiversity is itself
an inherently valuable commercial resource worth protecting. See
id. at 496–97. More to the point, biodiversity and the loss of biodiversity have serious economic impacts. See Nat’l Ass’n of Home
Builders, 130 F.3d at 1053–54 (“In the aggregate . . . we can be certain that the extinction of species and the attendant decline in biodiversity will have a real and predictable effect on interstate commerce.”). Under this formulation, FWS can argue that the ESA
can be justified vis-à-vis the regulated activity of taking an intrastate endangered species. Lear and Brittain County can respond that, as with frustrating commercial or agricultural development, the effect on commerce of taking an intrastate endangered
species is attenuated. As the PETPO court and a dissent in National Ass’n of Home Builders reasoned, “‘the Commerce Clause
empowers Congress “to regulate commerce” not “ecosystems.”‘“ See
PETPO, 57 F. Supp. 3d at 1344 (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1065 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). Further, as with
the education system in Lopez, if regulations can be justified by the
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impact of regulated activities on biodiversity, there may be no limit
to the Commerce Clause’s reach. PETPO, 57 F. Supp. 3d at 1344–
45; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565–66.
As a related argument, FWS may argue that the ESA as applied to Karner Blues can be justified because of possible future
effects on interstate commerce by Karner Blues. See Gibbs, 214
F.3d at 496–97; Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1054;
Palila v. Hawaii Dep’t of Land and Nat. Resources, 471 F. Supp.
985 (D. Haw.1979), aff’d, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981). In fact, legislative history of the ESA recognizes that because extinction is a
one-way street, extinction can have a serious future effect on commerce:
Who knows, or can say, what potential cures for cancer or other
scourges, present or future, may lie locked up in the structures of
plants which may yet be undiscovered, much less analyzed? More
to the point, who is prepared to risk being [sic] those potential
cures by eliminating those plants for all time? Sheer self interest
impels us to be cautious.

H.R. Rep. No. 93-412, at 4–5 (1973). Similarly, the Senate Report to a precursor the ESA stated: “Potentially more important,
however, is the fact that with each species we eliminate, we reduce
the [genetic] pool . . . available for use by man in future years.” S.
Rep. No. 91-526, at 3 (1969). Lear and Brittain County can reply
that since Lopez and Morrison, not only did PETPO reject this argument, but so did the Fifth Circuit in a case in which it otherwise
affirmed the constitutionality of the ESA. See GDF Realty, 326
F.3d at 638 (“The possibility of future substantial effects of the
Cave Species on interstate commerce, through industries such as
medicine, is simply too hypothetical and attenuated from the regulation in question to pass constitutional muster.”). They will
stress that the attenuation of the link between the regulated activity and its impact on interstate commerce matters, perhaps more
than the other factors, see Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612; Lopez, 514
U.S. at 562, and the connection between a wholly intrastate subpopulation of an insect species (with no commercial value other
than a miniscule amount to be paid in rent for wildlife viewing)
and imagined future impacts on interstate commerce is simply too
tenuous.
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Turning to other factors identified in Morrison, FWS should
point out that section 2 of the ESA speaks in direct terms about the
relationship between the ESA and commerce. See ESA § 2(a)(1),
16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(1) (“The Congress finds and declares that . . .
various species of fish, wildlife, and plants in the United
States have been rendered extinct as a consequence of economic
growth and development untempered by adequate concern and
conservation.”). In addition, the ESA does not just prohibit takes
in a general sense, but also specifically forbids the importation,
shipment, delivery, sale, or offer for sale of endangered species in
interstate or foreign commerce. See id. § 9(a)(1)(A),(D),(E),(F), 16
U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(A),(D),(E),(F). These are not only economic activities, they appear to be limited in some circumstances to interstate commerce. See id. Further, the FWS should point out that
there is in fact some evidence in the record regarding the economic
impact of these Karner Blues; the Brittain County Butterfly Society has offered to pay Lear $1,000 annually as rent for wildlife
viewing. See Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 492–93 (discussing red wolf-related tourism). Lear and Brittain County will likely respond to
the last point by pointing that isolated tourism is not tantamount
to a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See PETPO, 57 F.
Supp. 3d at 1344. They should also point out that section 11 of the
ESA allows for criminal prosecution, ESA § 11(b), 16 U.S.C.
§ 1540(b), and that there are no express congressional findings regarding the impact of Karner Blues on interstate commerce, see
PETPO, 57 F. Supp. 3d at 1344. FWS should reply, however, that
the Supreme Court has certainly upheld criminal statutes from
Commerce Clause challenges. Raich, 545 U.S. at 29.
Lear and Brittain County may analogize this case to Solid
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 172–74 (2001). Like this case,
SWANCC dealt with the reach of an environmental regulation—
the Army Corps of Engineers’ Migratory Bird Rule regarding the
jurisdictional reach of the Clean Water Act for dredge and fill permitting purposes—after Lopez and Morrison. The Supreme Court
explained that “[w]here an administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer limits of Congress’ power, we expect a clear
indication that Congress intended that result.” Id. at 172. “Thus,
‘where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would
raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the
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statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly
contrary to the intent of Congress.’” Id. at 173 (quoting Edward J.
DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)). Here, Brittain County and
Lear can argue that the case for the constitutionality of the Migratory Bird Rule is stronger than applying the ESA to the intrastate
population of Karner Blues: the birds in SWANCC actually travelled across state lines, whereas the Karner Blues in this case do
not; and “millions of people spend billions of dollars annually on
recreational pursuits relating to migratory birds,” whereas the
Brittain County Butterfly Society has offered to pay only $1,000
per year as rent for viewing the Karner Blues. Furthermore, while
the ESA take provision may mention interstate commerce in some
cases, see ESA § 9(a)(1)(E)–(F), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(E)–(F), it
does not in the general take provision, see id. § 9(a)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C.
§ 1538(a)(1)(B).
However, FWS can make arguments to distinguish SWANCC:
First, since SWANCC was ultimately not decided on constitutional
grounds but administrative procedure grounds—the court held
that the Migratory Bird Rule exceeded statutory authority under
the Clean Water Act—and since Lear did not bring her claim under
the Administrative Procedure Act, SWANCC is inapposite. Second, the Supreme Court rejected an Administrative Procedure Act
challenge to a broad interpretation of the definition of “harm” in
ESA section 9 that includes “significant habitat modification or
degradation that actually kills or injures wildlife.” Babbitt v. Sweet
Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687,
708 (1995). More importantly, however, FWS can point out that
the Clean Water Act’s findings do not mention commerce, see Clean
Water Act § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1251, but the ESA’s findings do. See
ESA § 2(a)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(a)(1).
FWS may also argue that the ESA need not only be found constitutional because it substantially affects interstate commerce—
the endangered species themselves can be viewed as “channels” of
interstate commerce like goods. See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders,
130 F.3d at 1046–48. In this regard, Congress may regulate intrastate takes of endangered species to “aid the prohibitions in the
ESA on transporting and selling endangered species in interstate
commerce.” Id. at 1047; see also United States v. Rambo, 74 F.3d
948, 952 (9th Cir. 1996) (rejecting a post-Lopez challenge to statute

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol8/iss1/2

20

38 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 8

criminalizing the possession of machine guns “because [the statute] is ‘an attempt to prohibit the interstate transportation of a
commodity through the channels of commerce’” (quoting Lopez, 514
U.S. at 559)). Additionally, the ESA can be justified as a part of
“‘the authority of Congress to keep the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious uses.’” Nat’l Ass’n of Home
Builders, 130 F.3d at 1048 (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964)). Lear can reply that more
recent cases have not adopted this position, apparently resisting
the idea that the endangered species are goods to be transported
or sold interstate commerce. See Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 491. Further,
the Heart of Atlanta rationale may in fact be more appropriately
considered as related to Congress’s power to regulate activities
that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See Rancho
Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1076 n.19 (“[T]he Court has repeatedly referred
to Heart of Atlanta . . . as also falling within the third category—
the regulation of activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce.” (Citing Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610; Lopez, 514 U.S.
at 559)).
Finally, the parties may make two other constitutional arguments that are not reflected in the district court opinion. First,
FWS may argue that even if the ESA exceeds congressional authority under the Commerce Clause, it is nevertheless constitutional under the Necessary and Proper Clause, which gives Congress the power to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers,” including
the Commerce Clause. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see Raich,
545 U.S. at 22. FWS’s argument will be that the ESA is constitutional with regard to the commercial activities it regulates, and
that failing to regulate takes of endangered species that may not
be for commercial purposes would substantially undermine the
ESA’s effectiveness elsewhere. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 28 (“The congressional judgment that an exemption for such a significant segment of the total market would undermine the orderly enforcement
of the entire regulatory scheme is entitled to a strong presumption
of validity.”). Indeed, Raich identified the prohibition of takes of
bald eagles as an example of constitutional uses of the Commerce
power when it said: “Prohibiting the intrastate possession or manufacture of an article of commerce is a rational (and commonly utilized) means of regulating commerce in that product.” Id. at 26 &
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n.36 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 668(a)). Notably, section 668(a) prohibits,
inter alia, the “take” of any bald eagle. Lear and Brittain County
will reply that PETPO is more persuasive: there is a national market for bald eagle feathers, but, as with Utah prairie dogs, there is
no national market for Karner Blue Butterflies. See PETPO, 57 F.
Supp. 3d at 1346. Lear and Brittain County can also argue that
taking Karner Blues, even to the point of extinction, would not significantly affect the viability of any of predator of the Karner Blues
that is regulated under the ESA. See id.
Second, Brittain County may argue that the ESA unduly intrudes upon the State authority protected by the Tenth Amendment. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156–57 (1992).
Lear may also make a Tenth Amendment argument: under Bond
v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 225–26 (2011), a private person—
and not just a State—may assert violations of the Tenth Amendment. Under this line of argument, management and conservation
of a wholly intrastate subpopulation of a species for which there is
no interstate market is a matter that should be regarded as within
the sphere of state sovereignty. See Baldwin v. Fish & Game
Comm’n of Montana, 436 U.S. 371, 384–87 (1978). Alternatively,
Brittain County can argue that if the ESA regulates land clearing
and residential construction (as FWS asserts), it intrudes on state
power. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006)
(plurality opinion) (“Regulation of land use, as through the issuance of the development permits . . . is a quintessential state and
local power.”). By intruding on these spheres, the ESA violates the
Tenth Amendment. FWS can reply that this is simply stating the
inverse of Brittain County’s and Lear’s general Commerce Clause
arguments: the Supreme Court has said that the Tenth Amendment “states but a truism that all is retained which has not been
surrendered.” United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941); see
also New York, 505 U.S. at 156. Even recent opinions that have
been more solicitous of the Tenth Amendment appear to suggest
the Tenth Amendment is something of an equivalent check on congressional power. See Bond, 564 U.S. at 225 (“Impermissible interference with state sovereignty is not within the enumerated
powers of the National Government, and action that exceeds the
National Government’s enumerated powers undermines the sovereign interests of States.” (Citation omitted.)). In other words, FWS
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would reply that while Brittain County may use the Tenth Amendment to mount a different rhetorical attack, it does not substantively alter the court’s analysis. See id. at 226 (“Whether the Tenth
Amendment is regarded as simply a ‘truism,’ or whether it has independent force of its own, the result here is the same.” (Citation
omitted.)).
V. TAKINGS CLAUSE:
Do the ESA and Brittain County Wetlands Preservation
Law combine to deprive the Cordelia lot of all economic
value?
In the district court, Lear argued that the ESA, together with
the Brittain County Wetlands Preservation Law, totally deprived
the Cordelia Lot of all economic value, resulting in a taking under
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992). FWS and Brittain County
resisted, arguing that neither the ESA nor the Wetlands Preservation Law totally deprived the Cordelia Lot of all economic value.
Additionally, they raised a number of arguments they believed precluded Lear’s takings claim. The district court rejected their arguments.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, inter alia, “nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.”16 In general, the Takings Clause
“bar[s] Government from forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole.” Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49
(1960). While this provision creates the power of condemnation, it
16. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment has been incorporated
against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897).
Additionally, the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on taking property for the public
use without paying just compensation has been called both the “Just Compensation Clause,” and the “Takings Clause.” Compare Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 175 (1985) (“Just
Compensation Clause”), with E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 520 (1998) (“Takings Clause”); see also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 306 n. 1 (2002) (recognizing the connection between the two
terms). This Bench Memo uses the term “Takings Clause” and refers to Lear’s
claim as a “takings claim.” However, where a title or quoted text uses the term
“Just Compensation Clause,” this Bench Memo will not alter it.
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has also been interpreted to prohibit “regulatory takings.” See
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles Cty.,
482 U.S. 304, 316 (1987); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414–
16 (1922). “The general rule at least is that while property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking.” Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 415. The Supreme
Court has “generally eschewed any ‘set formula’ for determining
how far is too far, preferring to ‘engag[e] in . . . essentially ad hoc,
factual inquiries.’” Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (quoting Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)). Yet,
some categorical rules do exist: pertinent to the instant case, when
a government regulation totally deprives a property owner of all
economic value of their property, a taking has occurred and the
government must pay the property owner just compensation. Id.
At the outset, it bears noting that the Problem states that Lear
“does not advance a claim for a partial regulatory taking
based on the principles of Penn Central. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres.
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 317–
18 (2002); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning
Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2000), aff’d 535 U.S. 302.”
Problem at 8 n.3. In the Tahoe-Sierra cases, the Ninth Circuit
noted the plaintiff not only did not advance a partial regulatory
taking claim under Penn Central, they “stated explicitly on this appeal that they do not argue that the regulations constitute a taking
under the ad hoc balancing approach described in Penn Central.”
Tahoe-Sierra, 216 F.3d at 773. The Supreme Court commented
that the “express[] disavow[al]” of Penn Central foreclosed the
plaintiffs’ recovery. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 334.
While the various arguments raised by FWS and Brittain
County would each preclude a claim of a categorical taking under
Lucas, it is possible that Lear could recover under Penn Central
even if any of the FWS and Brittain County defenses prevail. Cf.
Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 334 (“[I]f petitioners had challenged the
application of the moratoria to their individual parcels, instead of
making a facial challenge, some of them might have prevailed under a Penn Central analysis.”). Furthermore, the Problem arguably leaves ambiguous whether Lear waived a Penn Central claim
since it only says that she “does not advance a claim for a partial
regulatory taking,” but does not say anything regarding an express
disavowal of such a claim. To be sure, failure to make an argument
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in the district court generally results in waiver of that argument,
subject to exceptions not applicable here. See Cornhusker Cas. Ins.
Co. v. Kachman, 553 F.3d 1187, 1191 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Ordinarily,
an appellate court will not hear an issue raised for
the first time on appeal.” (Internal quotation omitted)). Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that some competitors may choose
to make arguments under Penn Central, but this Bench Memo will
not address a partial takings analysis under Penn Central.
Returning to Lear’s challenge as actually made in the district
court: Lear’s takings claim turns on six sub-issues: First, whether
Lear’s takings claim is ripe; second, whether the relevant parcel is
the Cordelia Lot or all of Lear Island; third, whether possible future developability precludes Lear’s takings claim; fourth, whether
the public trust doctrine precludes Lear’s takings claim; fifth,
whether the ESA and Brittain County Wetlands Preservation Law
can be combined to effect a Lucas taking of all economic value when
neither regulation, acting alone, would completely deprive the Cordelia Lot of all economic value; and sixth, whether the option to
receive some small residual value from the Brittain County Butterfly Society defeats Lear’s claim that her property has been deprived of all economic value. From a big picture standpoint, if Lear
loses any of these arguments, her takings claim based on a total
and permanent deprivation of all economic value likely fails.
A. RIPENESS: Is Lear’s takings claim ripe even though she
didn’t apply for an ITP?
Initially, FWS (and Brittain County) will argue that Lear’s
takings claim is not ripe since she did not apply for an ITP prior to
filing suit. Lear will respond that while she didn’t apply for an
ITP, the process would have been futile and the cost associated
with obtaining the permit exceeds the fair market value of the
property in question.
“The general rule is that a claim for a regulatory taking ‘is not
ripe until the government entity charged with implementing the
regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application
of the regulations to the property at issue.’” Morris v. United
States, 392 F.3d 1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting Williamson
Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186
(1985)); see also Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d
1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[A]bsent denial of the permit, only an
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extraordinary delay in the permitting process can give rise to a
compensable taking.”); cf. United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 127 (1985) (“A requirement that a person obtain a permit before engaging in a certain use of his or her
property does not itself ‘take’ the property in any sense . . . .”).
“Evaluating whether the regulations effect a taking requires knowing to a reasonable degree of certainty what limitations the agency
will, pursuant to regulations, place on the property.” Morris, 392
F.3d at 1376.
It is undisputed that Lear did not complete the formal process
for applying for an incidental take permit. However, Lear can argue that not only did make an inquiry to the FWS, the FWS sent
her a letter reiterating FWS Agent L.E. Pidopter’s position that
she must submit an HCP that would, at a minimum, provide additional contiguous lupine habitat on an acre-for-acre basis. Yet,
FWS and Brittain County will reply that the inquiry is not tantamount to a determination under the FWS’s rules, since Chapter
3 of the Habitat Conservation Planning Handbook17 contemplates
“pre-application coordination and HCP development.” Even actual
applications that are not completed because of an inability to reach
agreement with the agency do not ripen takings claims. See Howard W. Heck & Assoc. v. United States, 134 F.3d 1468, 1472 (Fed.
Cir. 1998). Further, the May 15, 2012 letter was not like a permit
denial, but rather a cease and desist letter. A cease and desist letter, like an injunction, is not tantamount to a permit denial. See
Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 126 (injunction); Boise Cascade Corp., 296 F.3d at 1346 (injunction); Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v.
United States, 10 F.3d 796, 800–01 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (cease and desist order). In other words, the FWS letter was an “‘assertion of
regulatory jurisdiction,’” which has been held insufficient to ripen
a claim for a taking. See Boise Cascade Corp., 296 F.3d at 1346
(quoting Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 126). “The mere
fact that an adverse decision may have been likely does not excuse
a party from a statutory or regulatory requirement that it exhaust
administrative remedies.” Corus Staal BV v. United States, 502
F.3d 1370, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

17. Available
at
mits/hcp/hcphandbook.html.
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However, Lear will argue that either of two exceptions save
her claim. First, if resort to the administrative process would be
futile, a takings claim plaintiff need not pursue it. See Freeman v.
United States, 124 Fed. Cl. 1, 6 (2015). Second, pursuit of a permit
is also unnecessary if a plaintiff can establish that “the procedure
to acquire a permit is so burdensome as to effectively deprive plaintiffs of their property rights.” Hage v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl.
147, 164 (1996).18 Whether Lear’s takings claim is ripe thus turns
on these exceptions.
First, Lear will argue that the application process would have
been futile. FWS Agent L.E. Pidopter had informed Lear that her
ITP application would have to be accompanied by an HCP, see ESA
§ 10(a)(2)(A), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A), and that any HCP would
necessarily require additional contiguous lupine habitat on an
acre-for-acre basis. The only contiguous land is the Goneril Lot,
and Goneril, who is estranged from Cordelia, has refused to participate in any HCP that requires restrictions on her land. Moreover,
whatever the technical requirements of the futility exception, Lear
will argue that she meets the spirit of the rule: “The reason for this
exception is that in such circumstances, no uncertainty remains
regarding the impact of the regulation, certainty being the basis
for the ripeness requirement.” Greenbrier v. United States, 193
F.3d 1348, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). Consequently,
Lear will argue that denial was inevitable, see Gilbert v. City of
Cambridge, 932 F.2d 51, 61 (1st Cir. 1991), and further administrative process could not “reasonably result in a more definite
statement of the impact of the regulation.” See Morris, 392 F.3d at
1376; see also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 625–26
(2001) (noting that when an agency “makes clear the extent of development permitted . . . federal ripeness rules do not require the
submission of further and futile applications with other agencies”).

18. Although no party addressed the issue before the district court, Lear’s
takings claim against Brittain County is also probably ripe. The Problem indicated that the Constitution of the State of New Union does not include a just compensation clause nor do the State of New Union’s statutes provide a procedure for
seeking just compensation. Problem at 9 n.5. The Supreme Court has suggested
that an absence of state-level just compensation procedures would ripen a federal
claim for an unconstitutional taking without just compensation against a state
entity. See Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 194.
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FWS and Brittain County will respond that “[t]he futility
exception does not alter an owner’s obligation to file one meaningful development proposal.” S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 922 F.2d 498, 504 (9th Cir. 1990). The Federal Circuit has explained “the futility exception simply serves ‘to protect property
owners from being required to submit multiple applications when
the manner in which the first application was rejected makes it
clear that no project will be approved.” Heck & Assoc., 134 F.3d at
1472 (quoting S. Pac. Transp. Co., 922 F.2d at 504). “The failure
to follow all applicable administrative procedures can only be excused in the limited circumstance in which the administrative entity has no discretion regarding the regulation’s applicability and
its only option is enforcement.” Greenbrier, 193 F.3d at 1359. Even
if Pidopter is correct about the FWS would likely require, they will
argue, unless that result is compelled by law and the FWS lacks
discretion, then Lear’s claim is not made ripe by the futility exception. Indeed, Morris was a takings case involving ITPs and the
ESA, and the Federal Circuit rejected a claim that the application
process was futile, reasoning in part that cooperation and discretion were built in to the ITP process. 392 F.3d at 1377.
Second, Lear will argue that since the cost of the HCP exceeds
the fair market value of the lot, the ITP application process is altogether confiscatory. In other words, if the cost of applying for an
ITP is so high that it totally outweighs the economic value of the
property, there is little difference between a regulation that completely prohibits economically valuable use of property and one
that makes economically valuable use impossible because applying
for the permit is too costly relative to the property. See Gilbert,
932 F.2d at 61 n.12; Lakewood Assoc. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl.
320, 333 (1999); Hage, 35 Fed. Cl. at 164; Stearns Co. v. United
States, 34 Fed. Cl. 264, 272 (1995). “Indeed, a regulatory program
which puts a landowner to the Hobson’s choice of spending good
money after bad in the remote hope of obtaining final administrative action or losing the right to assert a claim guaranteed by the
Fifth Amendment may well be a regulatory program gone far
afield.” Moore v. United States, 943 F. Supp. 603, 613 (E.D. Va.
1991). FWS and Brittain County will counter that this argument
was rejected in Morris. See 392 F.3d at 1377–78. “The cost of an
ITP application is unknowable until the agency has had some
meaningful opportunity to exercise its discretion to assist in the

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol8/iss1/2

28

46 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 8

process.” Id. at 1377. Moreover, in subsequent cases, the Court of
Federal Claims has emphasized that the Hage requires not just
economic futility, but that the procedure itself be unreasonable.
See Robbins v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 381, 388 (1998). The ITP
application process, including the submission of an HCP, is reasonable, they will contend, and the rule announced in Hage and
Stearns does not apply.
B. RELEVANT PARCEL: Should the district court have
considered all 1,000 acres of Lear Island as a whole or
just the 10 acres of the Cordelia Lot?
If Lear’s takings claim is ripe, then the court must determine
what the relevant parcel of property is for the purposes of Lear’s
Lucas takings claim. FWS and Brittain County will argue that
the relevant parcel is Lear Island as a whole since Cordelia Lear
did not come into possession of the Cordelia Lot until 2005, following her father’s passing. In contrast, Lear will argue that the relevant parcel is just the Cordelia Lot. The Penn Central Court explained that
“Taking” jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular
segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the nature
and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a
whole . . . .

438 U.S. at 130–31. In the context of a Lucas taking claim, “the
question of whether there has been a partial or total loss of economic use . . . depends on what is the specific property that was
affected by the permit denial.” Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United
States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1180 (Fed. Cir. 1994), abrogated on other
grounds by Palazzolo, 533 U.S. 606, as recognized in Bass Enters.
Prod. Co. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1360, 1369–70 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
This inquiry “is often expressed in the form of a fraction, the numerator of which is the value of the subject property encumbered
by regulation and the denominator of which is the value of the
same property not so encumbered.” Walcek v. United States, 49
Fed. Cl. 248, 258 (2001). Therefore, “one of the critical questions
is determining how to define the unit of property ‘whose value is to
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furnish the denominator of the fraction.’” Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987) (quoting
Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on
the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1165, 1192 (1967)). The Court has “expressed discomfort with
the logic of this rule,” Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 631, lamenting “the
rhetorical force of [the] ‘deprivation of all economically feasible use’
rule is greater than its precision, since the rule does not make clear
the ‘property interest’ against which the loss of value is to be measured.” Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7.
To identify the relevant parcel for the purposes of a takings
claim, courts have considered a variety of factors regarding “how
both the property-owner and the government treat (and have
treated) the property.” District Intown Props. Ltd. P’ship v. D.C.,
198 F.3d 874, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The factors include “the degree
of contiguity, the dates of acquisition, the extent to which the parcel has been treated as a single unit, and the extent to which the
restricted lots benefit the unregulated lot.” Id. To be sure, the
factors are nonexclusive. See Ciampitti v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct.
310, 318 (1991). Stated differently, courts apply “flexible approach,
designed to account for factual nuances.” Loveladies Harbor, 28
F.3d at 1181; see also Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d
1184, 1192 (Ct. Cl. 1981). “These factual nuances include consideration of the timing of transfers in light of the developing regulatory environment.” Loveladies Harbor, 28 F.3d at 1181.
Lear’s strongest argument may be to point out that a district
court’s determination following a bench trial regarding the relevant parcel is reviewed for clear error as a finding of fact. See id.
(“The trial court concluded that land developed or sold before the
regulatory environment existed should not be included in the denominator. The Government has failed to convince us that the trial
court clearly erred in this conclusion.”). FWS and Brittain
County should argue in response that while the district court’s
factual findings would only be reviewable for clear error, the relevant parcel determination should be treated as a legal conclusion
or application of law to fact that is reviewable de novo on appeal.
See Cree, 157 F.3d at 769. In the alternative, FWS and Brittain
County may argue that the district court applied the wrong standard: the district court appeared to reject the prevailing “flexible approach” standard and apply something more rigid instead. See
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Problem at 10. Applying the long legal standard is an abuse of
discretion. See Heimmerman v. First Union Mtg. Corp., 305 F.3d
1257, 1259 (11th Cir. 2002).
FWS and Brittain County will liken this case to District Intown (and cases like it) in that the Lears held these lands as a single lot for more than 150 years. See District Intown Props., 198
F.3d at 880 (concluding nine lots should be treated as a single lot
in part because “District Intown purchased the property as a whole
in 1961 and treated it as a single indivisible property for more than
25 years”). FWS and Brittain County will also argue that, like District Intown, King James Lear essentially treated the three lots as
a single lot even after subdivision in 1965. See id. Indeed, the Cordelia Lot didn’t come into separate possession or ownership until
King James’s passing in 2005. Further, the Cordelia Lot is contiguous with at least one other lot, the Goneril Lot. Lear’s strongest
response is to emphasize that there is no unity of ownership—unlike in District Intown, she doesn’t own the contiguous lots. Further, she will reply that it is unfair to treat the parcels as a whole
since she holds no rights in the contiguous Goneril Lot and is in
fact estranged from her sister. She will also argue that the Cordelia Lot does not benefit the Goneril Lot. Additionally, the facts
suggest that however it was treated by the government in the past,
the Cordelia Lot is taxed separately now. In fact, the Brittain
Town Planning Board approved the subdivision of lots in 1965 and
approved the construction of one single-family residence on each
lot.
FWS and Brittain County may make two other arguments
in favor of treating Lear Island as a single parcel, but neither is
likely to be particularly persuasive. First, FWS and Brittain
County may argue that the mere fact that Lear acquired the property after the passage of the ESA and adoption of the Brittain
County Wetlands Preservation Law defeats her claim. They might
reason that the reasonable “investment-backed expectations”
should be based on when the property existed as a whole. See Penn
Central, 438 U.S. at 124. However, this argument is unsupportable: Lear will correctly argue Palazzolo forecloses any argument
that post-regulation acquisition of the Cordelia Lot automatically
defeats her takings claim. See 533 U.S. at 627. In fact, Palazzolo
expressly contemplated that an heir or successor in interest could
(at least under some circumstances) maintain a takings challenge
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to a regulation that antedated the heir’s acquisition; “Future generations, too, have a right to challenge unreasonable limitations on
the use and value of land.” Id. at 627–28. Second, FWS and Brittain County may also argue that if the Cordelia Lot is the relevant parcel, then persons with portions (but not all) of their property subject to development restrictions will be encouraged to
divide their property into developable and undevelopable tracts,
and then seek just compensation for the deprivation of economic
value in the undevelopable tract. Lear should argue in response
that Loveladies Harbor forecloses this argument, when it acknowledged that the “flexible approach” accounts for the factual nuance
of the timing of the transfer. 28 F.3d at 1181. She will be able to
accurately point out there is no evidence of bad faith in the record
and that the transfer occurred 8 years prior to the passage of the
ESA and 17 years prior to the enactment of the Brittain County
Wetlands Preservation Law.
C. NATURAL DESTRUCTION: Does the fact that the
Cordelia Lot will become developable in approximately
ten years if Lear stops mowing the heath each October,
resulting the natural destruction of the Karner Blue
habitat, preclude Lear’s takings claim?
At trial, FWS argued that Lear’s takings claim must necessarily fail because her ability to develop the land has not been totally deprived, but merely delayed. The Karner Blue requires
fields of blue lupine flowers to survive, which in turn require partial shade from a successional forest to survive. If Lear ceases annual mowing of the Heath, it will convert to a successional forest
in about 10 years. In that case, the lupine flowers will not be able
to grow, and Karner Blue larvae will not be able to feed. With the
habitat naturally destroyed, Lear will be able to develop a portion
of the lot without taking Karner Blues. At trial, Brittain County
joined FWS’s argument. Lear disagreed, arguing the time to determine the existence of economically viable use was now. The district court agreed with Lear, recognizing precedent that permits
development or use of land to be delayed, but viewed 10 years as
too long a period of time.
Lucas held that a permanent deprivation of all economically
productive use constituted a taking for which just compensation
was due. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015; see also Tahoe-Sierra, 535

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol8/iss1/2

32

50 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 8

U.S. at 332. The Supreme Court has not determined when a temporary restriction becomes a permanent one. See Tahoe-Sierra,
535 U.S. at 335–36 (“We have no occasion to address . . . the distinction between a temporary restriction and one that is permanent.”). One way of looking at the issue is one of timing: if 10 years
is not too long to wait to develop her property, then Lear’s takings
claim must fail since she has not been deprived of all economically
viable use; rather, she has merely been delayed in exercising some
economically viable use. Another way of looking at the issue is
whether indefiniteness is tantamount to permanence: if so, then
future developability because of a hypothetical change in the facts
is irrelevant—the ESA imposes an indefinite bar to Lear’s developing the Cordelia Lot, and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
require the government to pay just compensation.
FWS and Brittain County can make a persuasive argument
that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Tahoe-Sierra totally precludes
finding a categorical taking based on a delay in developability. In
Tahoe-Sierra, an interstate development authority adopted a pair
of ordinances resulting in a 32-month moratorium on development
of land near Lake Tahoe. 535 U.S. at 306–07. When real estate
developers, who owned fee simple estates, brought a takings claim
under Lucas (but expressly disavowed a claim under Penn Central), the Court rejected a claim for a categorical, but temporary,
taking. See id. at 332. “Logically, a fee simple estate cannot be
rendered valueless by a temporary prohibition on economic use,
because the property will recover value as soon as the prohibition
is lifted.” Id. The Tahoe-Sierra Court emphasized that it did “not
reject a categorical rule in this case because a 32-month moratorium is just not that harsh. Instead, we reject a categorical rule
because we conclude that the Penn Central framework adequately
directs the inquiry to the proper considerations—only one of which
is the length of the delay.” Id. at 338 n.34. FWS and Brittain
County can draw further support from Boise Cascade Corp., which
rejected a categorical challenge to a temporary taking in the context of the ESA. See 296 F.3d at 1350.
Lear can find sympathetic language in Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s dissent in Tahoe-Sierra, which would employ the Lucas categorical takings approach after a delay of 6 years. See 535
U.S. at 343, 346–51 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Of course, FWS
and Brittain County can reply, as the Tahoe-Sierra majority did,
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that 6 years is an arbitrary amount of time. Further, dissents are,
by definition, not the law. And, in this regard, Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s dissent may bolster the argument that 10 years is not
too long: Chief Justice Rehnquist lamented that “the Court would
not view even a 10–year moratorium as a taking under Lucas because the moratorium is not ‘permanent.’” Id. at 347 (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting).
But Lear can also use Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent as a
bulwark for the argument that the delay here is indefinite, and
that indefiniteness is tantamount to permanence. While 10 years
is a good estimate of how long it may take the successional forest
to overtake the Heath, there can be no certainty. Lear may point
out that laws certainly can change and the government is allowed
to abandon condemned land, but courts have found those situations to be takings all the same. See id. at 346 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1011–12 (amendment of challenged ordinance), and United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 26 (1958)
(abandonment of condemned land)). Hypothetical future changes
in facts and law do not make indefinite restrictions temporary.
FWS and Brittain County can point to cases like Riverside
Bayview Homes and Boise Cascade Corp. as counterexamples: in
those cases injunctions and permit requirements (which the property owners had not fully availed themselves of) indefinitely limited the property owners’ use of their property, but those courts
suggested that the restrictions were not actually permanent and
that the property owners had not suffered a compensable taking.
As a final point, Lear may point out, as the district court recognized, the irony of the FWS relying on the natural destruction of
an endangered species critical habitat as a way to avoid providing
just compensation for protecting the Karner Blues. Moreover, the
ESA expressly permits the FWS to acquire lands to protect and
conserve endangered species. ESA § 5, 16 U.S.C. § 1534. Lear may
accordingly argue that this is exactly the kind of situation in which
FWS should use its acquisition power.
D. EQUAL FOOTING AND PUBLIC TRUST: Does the public
trust doctrine, inherent in the title to the Cordelia Lot,
preclude her takings claim?
At trial, Brittain County argued that the public trust doctrine inhered in Lear’s title and precluded her takings claim with
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respect to the Brittain County Wetlands Preservation Law. FWS
joined in this argument. Lucas recognized that background principles of property law limited the Takings Clause: “Where the State
seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all economically
beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner’s estate shows
that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin
with.” Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027 (emphasis added). The Federal
Circuit has prescribed a similar analytical framework for takings
claims: first, a court should determine whether a takings plaintiff
has a “stick in the bundle of property rights”; second, if so, the court
must determine whether the governmental action at issue constituted a taking of that ‘stick.’” Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. Ammon, 209
F.3d 1366, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The Ninth Circuit has recognized
that, where the public trust doctrine applies, it is indeed a background principle of law indicating that the proscribed interest was
not part of the property owner’s interest to begin with and thus can
indeed defeat a Lucas takings claim. See Esplanade Props., LLC
v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2002).
Thus, the nub of FWS and Brittain County’s argument is
that if either the equal footing doctrine vests title to the submerged
lands in New Union or the public trust doctrine inhered in Lear’s
title, Lear never possessed a requisite stick in the submerged
marshlands that the Brittain County Wetlands Preservation Law
could “take.” The district court disagreed, reasoning Brittain
County had pointed to no statement of state law as to the existence
or scope of the public trust doctrine in New Union. The district
court also reasoned that waters not influenced by the tides were
not navigable in 1803, and that, in any event, the equal footing
doctrine did not vest title to submerged lands in the State where
Congress granted title to submerged lands to a private person prior
to statehood. This issue turns on two sub-inquiries: first, whether
Lear or New Union owns the submerged lands; and second, if Lear
owns the submerged lands, whether the public trust doctrine limits
her ability to develop property there.
The public trust doctrine dates to Roman law, PPL Montana
LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1227 (2012), and states that a
State holds title to the beds of navigable waters “in trust for the
people of the state that they may enjoy the navigation of the wa-
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ter . . .” Ill. Cent. R. Co. v Illinois 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892). “Because title to [lands underlying certain waters] was important to
the sovereign’s ability to control navigation, fishing, and other commercial activity on rivers and lakes, ownership of this land was
considered an essential attribute of sovereignty.” Utah Div. of
State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 195 (1987). In this way,
the public trust and equal footing doctrines are closely related.
“The Court from an early date has acknowledged that the people
of each of the Thirteen Colonies at the time of independence ‘became themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute
right to all their navigable waters and the soils under them for
their own common use, subject only to the rights since surrendered
by the Constitution to the general government.’” Idaho v. Coeur
d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 283 (1997) (quoting Martin v.
Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 410 (1842)). “States entering the Union after
1789 did so on an ‘equal footing’ with the original States and so
have similar ownership over these ‘sovereign lands.’” Id. (quoting
Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 228–29 (1845)). “In consequence of
this rule, a State’s title to these sovereign lands arises from the
equal footing doctrine and is ‘conferred not by Congress but by the
Constitution itself.’” Id. (quoting Oregon v. Corvalis Sand &
Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 374 (1977)). Thus, upon statehood, “under the constitutional principle of equality among the several
states the title [submerged lands] then passe[s] to the state, if the
[water] was navigable, and if the [submerged lands] had not already been disposed of by the United States.” See United States v.
Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55 (1926); accord United States v.
Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931).
Thereafter, a state is free to retain the submerged lands or
dispose of them, but the public trust doctrine dictates that it may
not abdicate its interest in navigable waters and its duty to protect
the use of the water for navigation and fishing in trust to the public. Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 453. The precise “contours of that public
trust” are determined by state, not federal law. PPL Montana, 132
S. Ct. at 1235. The States’ power to determine the contours of its
public trust doctrine are “subject only to ‘the paramount power of
the United States to control such waters for purposes of navigation
in interstate and foreign commerce.’” Id. at 1228 (quoting United
States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935)).
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First, Lear will argue that the public trust doctrine did not
apply to non-tidal navigable waters like Lake Union in 1803. See
PPL Montana, 132 S. Ct. at 1227 (collecting cases rejecting the
tide-based distinction regarding navigable waters, the earliest of
which was decided in 1810). FWS will point out that navigability
turns on whether the water was navigable at the time of statehood
“based on the ‘natural and ordinary condition’ of the water.” Id. at
1228 (quoting Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 591 (1922)). The
Problem is not specific about when New Union obtained statehood.
As an inland lake, Lake Union is presumably not influenced by the
tides. Therefore, Lear will argue that since the tides did not influence Lake Union in 1803, it cannot be a public trust water.
FWS and Brittain County may reply directly to Lear’s tidebased argument by pointing to case language regarding the English common law rule suggesting it would have applied more
broadly had England shared America’s larger waterways that are
not otherwise influenced by the tide: “the reason of the rule would
equally apply to navigable waters above the flow of the tide; that
reason being, that the public authorities ought to have entire control of the great passageways of commerce and navigation, to be
exercised for the public advantage and convenience.” Barney v.
City of Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 337–38 (1876). Indeed, in The Propeller Genesee Chief, Chief Justice Taney wrote that the constitutional
drafters and founding generation would not have intended to limit
the benefit of admiralty courts to incidents taking place over tidally
influenced waters. 53 U.S. 443, 454 (1851). Lear may point out
the irony that in making that statement, the Genesee Chief Court
had to overrule a pair of older cases that applied the tide-based
distinction. FWS and Brittain County may also choose to argue
that some early public trust cases, such as Carson v. Blazer, can be
read to suggest that first, that tide-based distinction in navigability never applied in the United States. See 2 Binn. 475, 484–85
(Pa. 1810) (“[T]he uniform idea has ever been, that only such parts
of the common law as were applicable to our local situation have
been received in this government. The principle is self-evident.”).
Lear can reply that the Supreme Court has characterized those
cases as a rejection of the tide-based distinction. See Coeur d’Alene
Tribe, 521 U.S. at 286. Finally, FWS and Brittain County may
choose to point out that even some English common law cases recognized the flow of the tides is not truly what made a body of water
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navigable and, therefore was not controlling. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 487 (1988) (discussing Mayor
of Lynn v. Turner, 98 Eng. Rep. 980, 981 (K.B. 1774)); see also Executors of Cates v. Wadlington, 12 S.C.L. 580, 582 (1822) (discussing English common law).
In any event, Lake Union is navigable-in-fact; it is a large interstate lake that has been used for interstate navigation, including the transport of agricultural products. See United States v.
Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 56 (1926); The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S.
557, 563 (1871). Notably, navigability as it applies in the public
trust and equal footing context does not require interstate navigation; rather, it simply requires that the water be used or susceptible to use in navigation, even intrastate navigation. PPL Montana,
132 S. Ct. at 1229; Utah, 283 U.S. at 76. Thus, FWS and Brittain
County’s stronger reply is to Lear’s initial point out that the public trust cases Lear cites are state cases, and that the question of
navigability is a federal question. Utah, 283 U.S. at 75. PPL Montana directs a court to look at the physical characteristics of the
water body at the time of statehood, not the legal regime. See PPL
Montana, 132 S. Ct. at 1228. Indeed, “[t]o treat the question as
turning on the varying local rules would give the Constitution a
diversified operation where uniformity was intended.” Holt State
Bank, 270 U.S. at 56. If the extent of state sovereignty over submerged lands turned on the state of a developing legal regime at
the time of statehood, it could violate the equal footing doctrine.
Finally, FWS and Brittain County may point to Illinois (which
achieved statehood in 1818) and Minnesota (which achieved statehood in 1858) as examples of cases where statehood preceded the
Supreme Court’s apparent recognition that the appropriate test
was navigability and not whether the water is tidally influenced.
See Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. at 57 (concluding, in 1926, that a
small intrastate lake was navigable and thus belonged to Minnesota under the equal footing doctrine); Ill. Central, 146 U.S. at 452
(holding, in 1892, that state sovereignty, and thus the public trust
doctrine, extended to submerged lands in the Great Lakes).
Lear will argue that even if Lake Union was navigable at the
time of New Union’s statehood, Congress’s grant to Cornelius Lear
in 1803 (sometime prior to statehood) defeats Brittain County’s argument. Congress granted fee simple absolute to all of Lear Island
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and to “all lands under water within a 300-foot radius of the shoreline of said island,” as well as an additional grant of lands under
water in the shallow strait separating Lear Island from the mainland to Cornelius Lear. Lear may argue, as the district court reasoned, that this defeats an argument that New Union can avail
itself of the public trust doctrine. Certainly, “Congress has the
power before statehood to convey land beneath navigable waters.”
Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262, 272 (2001); Shively v. Bowlby,
152 U.S. 1, 48 (1894); see U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“Congress
shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States.”).
Brittain County and FWS will reply that “[a] court deciding
a question of title to the bed of a navigable water must . . . begin
with a strong presumption against conveyance by the
United States.” Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 552
(1981); see also United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 35 (1997). A
prior congressional grant of submerged lands only defeats a future
State’s claim when clear language appears in the grant. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 552 (collecting cases). Ultimately, “[w]hether title to submerged lands rests with a State, of course, is ultimately
a matter of federal intent.” Alaska, 521 U.S. at 36. The Supreme
Court has repeatedly found that pre-statehood congressional
grants of submerged lands do not overcome the presumption. See,
e.g., Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. at 58 (holding lake entirely contained in lands given by pre-statehood congressional grant was
property of the State, not congressional grantee). The Holt State
Bank Court commented that there was nothing in the grant there
“which even approaches a grant of rights in lands underlying navigable waters; nor anything evincing a purpose to depart from the
established policy . . . of treating such lands as held for the benefit
of the future State.” Id. at 58–59. In fact, in only one case did the
prior grant defeat a State’s equal footing claim, see Choctaw Nation
v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 634–35 (1970), “and indispensable to
the [Choctaw Nation] holding was a promise to the Indian Tribe
that no part of the reservation would become part of a State.” Utah
Div. of State Lands, 482 U.S. at 198; see Montana, 450 U.S. at 555
n.5; Choctaw Nation, 397 U.S. at 635.
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Lear will argue that the grant was rendered “in clear and especial words,” Martin, 41 U.S. at 411, and “confirmed in terms embraces the land under the waters” of Lake Union. See Packer v.
Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 672 (1891); see also Montana, 450 U.S. at 552.
The 1803 grant specifically refers to “all lands under water within
a 300-foot radius of the shoreline of [Lear Island].” FWS and Brittain County will argue that the indispensible element of Choctaw
Nation—that the United States promised “that ‘no part of the land
granted to them shall ever be embraced in any Territory or State,’”
397 U.S. at 635—is absent here, and that that fact is controlling.
In their view, it is the intention to defeat a future State’s equal
footing claim that must be “‘definitely declared or otherwise made
very plain.’” Utah Div. of State Lands, 482 U.S. at 202 (quoting
Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. at 55). Lear can persuasively reply,
however, that the Utah Division of State Lands opinion expressly
equated the two intents in the context of a grant to a third party:
“When Congress intends to convey land under navigable waters to
a private party, of necessity it must also intend to defeat the future
State’s claim to the land.” Id.
If the equal footing doctrine does not vest title to New Union,
then Lear will argue that Illinois Central’s holding regarding the
public trust was “necessarily a statement of Illinois law,” Appleby
v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 395 (1926). In fact, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly stressed that state law defines the rights under the public trust doctrine. See Packer, 137 U.S. at 669 (“[W]hatever incidents or rights attach to the ownership of property conveyed by the government will be determined by the states, subject
to the condition that their rules do not impair the efficacy of the
grants, or the use and enjoyment of the property, by the grantee.”).
“[T]he public trust doctrine remains a matter of state law . . . .”
PPL Montana, 132 U.S. at 1235. The Problem makes clear that
there is no decisional law from New Union exists regarding the
scope of the public trust doctrine. Problem at 11. FWS and Brittain County will point to language in Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe
of Idaho that while Illinois Central was a statement of state law,
“it invoked the principle in American law recognizing the weighty
public interests in submerged lands.” 521 U.S. 261, 283 (1997).
Therefore, since holding the waters in public trust is a such close
incident of sovereignty, see Utah Div. of State Lands, 482 U.S. at
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195, it is not at all unreasonable to infer that the public trust doctrine has “‘always existed’” in New Union even if not explicitly recognized. See Esplanade Props., 307 F.3d at 985 (quoting Orion
Corp. v State, 747 P.2d 1062, 1072 (Wa. 1987)). In their view, since
the doctrine has always existed, it would necessarily inhere in
Lear’s title. However, because public trust issues can be quite
thorny, and the precise public trust issue is not only the existence
of the public trust doctrine in New Union but whether and how it
applies to the submerged lands near the shore of Lear Island, Lear
can point to cases where federal courts have dismissed claims involving unsettled public trust issues. See, e.g., Brigham Oil & Gas,
L.P. v. North Dakota Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 866 F. Supp. 2d
1082, 1089–91 (D.N.D. 2012). Cases like Brigham Oil demonstrate
that federal courts resist construing the scope of a State’s public
trust doctrine whenever possible.
E. DEPRIVATION OF ALL ECONOMIC VALUE: Can the
ESA and the Brittain County Wetlands Preservation
Law be joined for purposes of Lear’s categorical takings
claim based on a complete deprivation of economic
value?
As an ultimate issue at trial, Lear argued that the ESA and
Brittain County Wetlands Law have totally deprived the Cordelia
Lot of economic value, amounting to a taking under Lucas. FWS
and Brittain County each argued that their respective regulations did not individually amount to a Lucas taking. FWS argued
that the ESA (nor any other federal regulation) prohibited Lear
from constructing a residence in cove area. Brittain County
made a similar argument: the Brittain County Wetlands Preservation Law did not prohibit construction in the Heath. In any event,
FWS and Brittain County argued that no Lucas taking occurred
because the property retains some residual economic value: the
Brittain County Butterfly Society has offered to pay $1,000 a year
in rent for wildlife viewing. The district court disagreed, concluding that the regulations could be considered together and that the
butterfly society’s offer did not preclude Lear’s takings claim.
1.

Whether the ESA and Brittain County Wetlands
Law Can Be Combined to Consider Whether a
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Taking Has Occurred.
Regarding the question of whether two regulations administered by two defendants can be jointly considered as effecting a total deprivation of all economic use of property under Lucas, there
does not appear to be precedent on point. Because of the general
lack of decisive precedent on the matter, the parties will likely
make a number of policy arguments.
To be sure, Lear may argue that precedent supports the joint
consideration of multiple regulations or administrative actions.
She can cite Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 337–38, and Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 255 (1980),19 as cases where two municipal
ordinances were considered together in a takings claim. Additionally, Lear may cite United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253 (1980)
considered whether a federal statute—25 U.S.C. § 357, which authorizes a state or local government to condemn lands allotted to
Native Americans in the same manner other lands held in fee may
be condemned—permitted a municipal government to condemn
land by physical taking. Clarke thus arguably demonstrates a
blending of state and federal law in the context of takings claims.
FWS and Brittain County can reply that none of those cases
involve takings that were joint takings by two different governments. For instance, Clarke did not did not feature a claim of a
joint taking by the United States and local government, but rather
an intergovernmental dispute in which an Alaska municipality attempted to physically occupy federal land held in trust by Native
Americans. More importantly, they can argue that even if two provisions of a single regulatory schema could be combined in a takings claim in some cases, as in Agins, it would be inappropriate
where two levels of government are concerned. It might make
sense to consider one regulatory schema (administered by one government entity) as a whole, but considering two different government entities’ regulations together is simply impractical. Federalism generally permits different governments to pass different laws,
and, the federal government generally cannot control the applicability of a state or local law absent preemption. Cf. Tahoe-Sierra,

19. Agins was abrogated on other grounds by Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,
544 U.S. 528, 545 (2005). The Court in Lingle “conclude[d] that the “substantially
advances” formula announced in Agins is not a valid method of identifying regulatory takings for which the Fifth Amendment requires just compensation.”
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535 U.S. at 344 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (discussing causation
under takings claims brought pursuant to section 1983); Esplanade Props., 307 F.3d at 984 (“[A] plaintiff must make a showing
of causation between the government action and the alleged deprivation.”).
Lear can persuasively reply, however, that cooperative federalism is conducive to joint takings. For instance, she can point to
the Clean Water Act, which requires a potential discharger to seek
certification from States in which the discharge will occur that the
discharge will not result in violation of the State’s water quality
standards. Clean Water Act § 401(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1).
The State may condition certification on compliance with State water quality standards. Id. § 401(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d). EPA has
a related rule that prohibits the issuance of a federal permit if it
“cannot ensure compliance with the applicable water quality requirements of all affected States.” 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(d). Lear
might point this or similar cooperative schema as an example
where a taking could be foreseeable.
Lear can argue the nature of an inverse condemnation suit
supports the conclusion that multiple provisions of law should be
able to be considered together: “‘[i]nverse condemnation is a cause
of action against a governmental defendant to recover the value of
property which has been taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency.’” Clarke, 445 U.S.
at 257 (quoting D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND
DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 328 (1971)). Indeed, an inverse condemnation suit may be appropriate precisely because the government is unaware it has taken the plaintiff’s property. Here, Lear
can argue that the point of an inverse condemnation suit is to recover the value that has actually “been taken.” The fact that is
actually been taken by the combined operation of the regulatory
regimes of two different governments should not preclude recovery.
In this vein, Lear will also argue that the two regulations in
this case produced an “indivisible injury,” so the FWS and Brittain
County should be jointly and severally liable. See, e.g., Velsicol
Chem. Corp. v. Rowe, 543 S.W.2d 337, 343 (Tenn. 1976) (“[W]e . . .
adopt . . . the rule for determining joint and several liability that
when an indivisible injury has been caused by the concurrent, but
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independent, wrongful acts or omissions of two or more wrongdoers . . . .”).20 FWS and Brittain County can reply that even if this
rule were law, it wouldn’t save Lear’s claim. The Velsicol Chemical
rule requires an injury to be “indivisible.” See id. In fact, the Supreme Court of Tennessee relied on decisions from Texas, Landers
v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co., 248 S.W.2d 731, 734 (Tex.
1952), and the Sixth Circuit, Michie v. Great Lakes Steel Division,
495 F.2d 213, 216 (6th Cir. 1974), which reasoned in adopting the
same rule that the rule was necessary to save a plaintiff in some
cases from bearing an “impossible burden” of proving which defendant contributed which share to an indivisible injury. Here,
they will argue, that is hardly the case: the ESA plainly affects one
portion of Lear’s property (the Heath), and the Brittain County
Wetlands Preservation Law affects another (the Cove). In their
view, there is nothing at all indivisible about the injury; Lear
might have had two separate partial takings claims, but she has
no categorical takings claim regarding the parcel as a whole.
FWS and Brittain County may also argue that the indirect
effects of government regulation are not always clear to legislators,
so combining multiple regulations is not necessarily fair to the government. This is particularly true of a regulation’s intersections
with other statutes and ordinances. Lear can respond, however,
that Congress (and other legislators) are presumed to know the
state of the law. Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 699
(1979).
2.

Whether the Cordelia Lot Has Been Deprived of All
Economic Value.

FWS and Brittain County will point out that the Cordelia
Lot has not actually been deprived of all economic value. The Brittain County Butterfly Society offered to pay Lear $1,000 per year
in rent for wildlife viewing.
They will point out the Supreme Court’s precedent has “uniformly rejected” the proposition that a mere “diminution in value,
standing alone, can establish a ‘taking.’” Penn Central, 438 U.S.
at 131. Indeed, in making that statement, the Penn Central Court
identified diminutions in value of 87.5 and 75 percent as examples
20. Many states have such a common law rule. The Problem simply cited
Velsicol Chemical as an example of the “prevailing rule.” Problem at 12.
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of takings claim it had rejected. See id. (citing Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (87.5% diminution) and Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (75% diminution)).
Instead, these diminutions are merely the result of the government
“adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life for the common good.” See id. at 124. Indeed, the Supreme Court did not find
a taking in Palazzolo, which featured an overwhelming 93% loss of
value in the plaintiff’s property. See 533 U.S. at 616, 631. FWS
and Brittain County can find similar support in Lucas: in a footnote, the majority of the Court suggested the proper recourse for a
property owner deprived of 95% of economic value was a claim for
partial regulatory taking under Penn Central, not a claim for a categorical taking under Lucas. 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8.
FWS and Brittain County will also argue that even if ESA
and the Brittain County Wetlands Preservation Law eliminate the
“most profitable use” or the “most beneficial use,” it is not dispositive. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979); Goldblatt v.
Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592 (1962). Supportive language is also found in later Supreme Court discussions on the
topic: “In the Lucas context, of course, the complete elimination of
a property’s value is the determinative factor.” Lingle v. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) (emphasis added). In contrast, Lear will argue that she retains at most a “token interest.”
See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 631 (“Assuming a taking is otherwise
established, a State may not evade the duty to compensate on the
premise that the landowner is left with a token interest.”).
Further, Lear can point to Loveladies Harbor as an example
where something less than a 100% diminution of value was recognized as a total taking. There, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
district court’s conclusion that where property value was diminished from $2,658,000 to $12,500—a more than 99% loss. See 28
F.3d at 1178, 1182. Here, the Cordelia Lot had a fair market value
of $100,000 prior to the regulation. There is no market in which
she can sell the Cordelia Lot, so the property’s value appears value
appears to be $0. Of course, the property has a rental value of
$1,000 a year in light of the Brittain County Butterfly Society’s offer. However, the property taxes on the Cordelia Lot are $1,500
annually—resulting in a $500 annual net loss. Lear will thus argue that the value of the Cordelia Lot is nil.
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However, Lear’s strongest argument is that the district court
found as a matter of fact that the Cordelia Lot had been deprived
of all economic value. She will point out that Loveladies Harbor
counsels that this factual determination reviewable for clear error.
See id. at 1182 (“The trial court’s conclusion that the permit denial
was effectively a total taking of the property owner’s interest in
these acres is fully supported in the record; there is no clear error
in that conclusion.”). As with the relevant parcel determination,
FWS and Brittain County should argue that this is a legal conclusion, not a finding of fact. Findings of fact like the value of the
property may only be reviewable for clear error, but the determination that the Cordelia Lot has been deprived of economic value
is a legal conclusion, they will argue, and it should accordingly be
reviewed de novo.
FWS and Brittain County may find other, more speculative,
arguments regarding the financial value of the Cordelia Lot; however, the record does not disclose any evidence regarding other economically productive uses, which should defeat any resort to them
now. See Lost Tree Village Corp. v. United States, 787 F.3d 1111,
1117 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“The government did not produce evidence
indicating that Lost Tree could sell Plat 57 in such a condition.
Speculative land uses are not considered as part of a takings inquiry.”); see also Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 257 (1934).
VI. SAMPLE QUESTIONS FOR JUDGES
These questions are suggested as a starting point. Please feel free
to develop your own.
Issue 1: Whether the ESA is a valid exercise of Congress’s
Commerce power
•

•

Brittain County
o What sovereign interests does the ESA infringe on?
o Isn’t the Tenth Amendment simply a “truism?” Or
does the Tenth Amendment add something to your
claim here beyond the limits imposed by Commerce
Clause cases?
Lear
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Why shouldn’t we follow the long line of cases that
hold the ESA is a constitutional exercise of the Commerce power?
Doesn’t the Brittain County Butterfly Society’s offer
to pay $1,000 per year in rent for wildlife viewing
demonstrate that there is some link to commerce
here?
Doesn’t Raich indicate that Congress can regulate
local activity so long as it is part of a class of activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce?
Can the ESA be considered a regulation of the channels of interstate commerce?

FWS
o Is justifying the ESA’s application to the Karner
Blue with biodiversity consistent with Lopez and
Morrison?
o What effect on commerce does biodiversity have?

Issue 2(a): Whether Lear’s takings claim is ripe without
having applied for an ITP permit
•

•

Brittain County and FWS
o What great certainty regarding the scope of the
ESA’s burden on the Cordelia Lot could be achieved
by requiring Lear to apply for an ITP?
o Why should Lear have to apply for an ITP when the
cost of meaningfully applying for it would be more
than the fair market value of the Cordelia Lot?
Lear
o Why should we treat Lear’s inquiry to the FWS as
the equivalent of a permit application?
o Why the futility exception be extended to situations
where no formal permit application has been completed?

Issue 2(b): Whether the relevant parcel is the Cordelia Lot
or all of Lear Island
•

FWS and Brittain County
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Didn’t the district court determine a matter of fact
that the relevant parcel is the Cordelia Lot? If so,
isn’t it reviewable only for clear error?
Does the lack of unity of ownership here require a
conclusion that the Cordelia Lot should be treated as
the relevant parcel?

Lear Island was a single parcel of property for 150
years, and was treated as a single parcel of property
for another 40 years after that. Why should it be
treated separately now?
Does the fact that Lear came into possession of the
property after the enactment of the ESA and Brittain County Wetlands Preservation Law preclude
her takings claim?

Issue 2(c): Whether future developability based on natural
destruction of the butterfly habitat precludes Lear’s
takings claim
•

•

FWS and Brittain County
o Doesn’t it seem incongruous to use the potential destruction of the Karner Blues’ habitat as a defense
to takings claim?
o Isn’t Lear’s inability to develop the Cordelia Lot for
ten years essentially a permanent deprivation?
o When should the permanence of a deprivation be determined?
o At what point does a temporary deprivation become
a permanent one?
Lear
o What is the harm in waiting ten years to construct a
residence on the Cordelia Lot?
o Didn’t the Tahoe-Sierra Court suggest that Lucas is
never the appropriate vehicle for challenging a temporary deprivation of economic value?

Issue 2(d): Whether public trust doctrine principles
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preclude Lear’s takings claim
•

•

FWS and Brittain County
o Did navigability extend to Lake Union in 1803?
o Why isn’t the 1803 congressional grant specific
enough about providing title to the submerged
marshlands?
o Without a rule of state law, can we know what the
scope of the public trust doctrine is in New Union?
If not, shouldn’t we refrain from trying to predict it
here?
Lear
o Is the navigability of Lake Union a question of federal law or state law?
o Does the 1803 congressional grant satisfy clearly indicate a congressional intent to defeat a future
state’s title to the lakebed of Lake Union?
o Isn’t the public trust doctrine universal enough that
we could consider its scope here?

Issue 2(e)(1): Whether the ESA and the county wetlands
regulation can be considered together for takings
purposes
•

•

FWS and Brittain County
o Don’t cases like Tahoe-Sierra and Agins v. City of Tiburon demonstrate that the Supreme Court is willing to consider multiple laws together?
o Environmental statutes frequently employ principles of cooperative federalism. Where the purpose of
a regulatory regime is to have two levels of government cooperate, doesn’t considering the regulations
together seem appropriate?
Lear
o Has any court considered a joint taking before?
o Why shouldn’t we consider the diminution of the
value of the Cordelia Lot to be a divisible injury?

Issue 2(e)(2): Whether the butterfly society’s offer to pay
$1,000 per year in rent for wildlife viewing defeats Lear’s
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takings claim
•

•

FWS and Brittain County
o Isn’t the Brittain County Butterfly Society’s offer, at
most, just a “token interest?”
o Does the fact that Lear’s property taxes are higher
than what the butterfly society would pay require a
conclusion that the Cordelia Lot has been deprived
of all economic value?
o Is the district court’s finding that the Cordelia Lot
has been deprived of all economic value a finding of
fact? In that case, can we only review it for clear error?
Lear
o Is the district court’s finding that the Cordelia Lot
been deprived of all economic value a finding of fact,
or is it an application of law to fact that is reviewable
de novo?
o Isn’t this just a diminution in value of the sort the
Supreme Court has held to be non-compensable?
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ISSUES TABLES

Summary of Parties’ Positions by Issue
Issue
Brittain
Lear
County

FWS

Is the ESA constitutional under
the Commerce Clause?

No

No

Yes

Is Lear’s takings claim ripe even
though she did not apply for an
ITP?
For Lear’s takings claim, is the
relevant parcel the entirety of
Lear Island ore merely the Cordelia Lot?
Does the fact that the Cordelia
Lot will become developable
upon the natural destruction of
the butterfly habitat in 10 years
preclude Lear’s takings claim?

No

Yes

No

Lear Island

Cordelia Lot

Lear Island

Yes

No

Yes

Do public trust doctrine principles inherent in title preclude
Lear’s claim for a taking?

Yes

No

Yes

Are FWS and Brittain County liable for a complete deprivation
of the economic value of the Cordelia Lot when neither the ESA
nor the county wetlands regulation would, by itself, completely
prohibit Lear from building a
single-family residence?
Does the Brittain County Butterfly Society’s offer to pay $1,000
per year in rent for wildlife viewing preclude a takings claim for
complete loss of economic value?

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes
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Summary of Parties’ Procedural Postures by Issue
Issue
District
Brittain
Lear PosCourt
County Posture on ApHolding
ture on Appeal
peal
ESA constitutional?
Yes.
Appeals and
Appeals and
argues no.
argues no.
Takings claim ripe?

FWS
Posture on
Appeal
(Agrees with
District
Court)
Appeals and
argues no.

Yes.

Appeals and
argues no.

The Cordelia
Lot.

Appeals and
argues Lear
Island is the
relevant parcel

Does developability upon natural destruction of the butterfly
habitat in 10 years defeat
Lear’s takings claim?

No.

Appeals and
argues no

(Agrees with
District
Court)

Appeals and
argues no

Do public trust doctrine principles inherent in Lear’s title preclude her takings claim?

No.

Appeals and
argues no

(Agrees with
District
Court)

Appeals and
argues no

Are FWS and Brittain County
liable for a total deprivation of
economic value even though
neither the ESA nor the county
wetlands regulation, acting
alone, would totally deprive the
Cordelia Lot of economic value?
Does the butterfly society’s offer
to pay $1,000 per year in rent
for wildlife viewing preclude a
takings claim based on total
deprivation of economic value?

Yes.

Appeals and
argues no

(Agrees with
District
Court)

Appeals and
argues no

No.

Appeals and
argues no

(Agrees with
District
Court)

Appeals and
argues no

Relevant parcel?
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(Agrees with
District
Court)
(Agrees with
District
Court)

69

Appeals and
argues Lear
Island is the
relevant parcel
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